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Ever since ET, the extraterrestrial, was lured from his hiding place with
Reese's Pieces, manufacturers have recognized the tremendous power of movies and other artistic
works to shape consumer attitudes toward their products. Often these associations are extremely
positive-prompting manufacturers to pay  huge fees to have their products prominently  featured in
films and telev ision programming. 
But not all mentions are welcome. Frequently , artists and trademark owners clash when "marks" are
made the subject of parodies, satires, or other allegedly  negative portray als. Invariably , the
trademark owners respond with federal infringement claims and state law claims based on unfair
competition and antidilution. 
Basics of Infringem ent Claim s
The underly ing tenet of the federal trademark law, the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129), is
consumer protection. First and foremost, the law is designed to protect the "source identify ing"
function of trademarks-to preserve a trademark's ability  to identify  the prov ider of the goods or
serv ices associated with the mark. (Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537  U.S. 418 (2003).)
As such, the touchstone of trademark infringement is consumer confusion. Fundamentally , plaintiffs
asserting infringement stemming from unauthorized use of their products and trademarks in artistic
works argue that consumers are likely  to think that the movie, literary  work, song, or other artistic
depiction is endorsed by , sponsored by , or somehow affiliated with the plaintiffs' trademarked
products. (See, Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods, 7 3 F.3d 497  (2d Cir. 1996); Caterpillar v.
Walt Disney Studios, 287  F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2003)).
Dilution: Blurring and T arnishm ent
Unlike infringement's focus on consumer protection, trademark dilution laws are closer to earned
property  rights-with the focus on protecting the mark owner's ability  to control how the trademark is
used or display ed. The first ty pe of dilution, called blurring, encompasses claims that a defendant's use
of a trademark will lessen association of the mark with a plaintiff's product. The second ty pe,
tarnishment, is based on a defendant's conduct that places the trademark in an unsavory  light, causing
negative associations with the mark.
Blurring claims are best illustrated by  Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. (296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537  U.S. 117 1  (2003)), which involved the toy maker's claim that a music group
diluted its trademark by  using the name Barbie in the group's song "Barbie Girl." Although absolv ing
the defendant of liability , the court acknowledged that the defendant's use was blurring, in that "after
the song's popular success, some consumers hearing Barbie's name will think of both the doll and the
song, or perhaps of the song only ." (296 F. 3d at 904.) 
The driv ing concern in most trademark dilution cases involv ing artistic works is tarnishment. In these
cases plaintiffs allege that the artists' depictions or use of the plaintiffs' trademarks degrade the marks'
reputation. For example, in Wham-O, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp. (286 F. Supp. 2d 1254 (N.D.
Cal. 2003)), the producers of the movie Dickie Roberts: Former Child Star were sued for their comical
misuse of the plaintiff's trademarked Slip-n-Slide toy . 
A sampling of cases from various courts reveals analogous claims of damages to commercial
reputation by  association with: 
1 . sex  and obscenity  (Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.
197 9) (associating plaintiffs-cheerleaders with pornographic movie)); 
2. illegal narcotic activ ity  (Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y  197 2)
(Coke trademark display ed on poster with words Enjoy Cocaine in place of Enjoy Coke)); 
3. unfavorable social and political outcomes (Caterpillar v. Walt Disney Studios, 287  F. Supp. 2d 913
(2003) (plaintiff's bulldozers used to tear down a rain forest)); and 
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4. a notorious murder trial (Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal.
1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997 ) (using plaintiff's trademarked character in a satirical book
about the O. J. Simpson murder case)). 
Where the Law Is Now
Unauthorized depictions in artistic works present unique analy tical problems. Obviously , distributing
the latest bestseller book and the next blockbuster movie are commercial activ ities within the ambit
of federal commerce power-the ultimate constitutional source for federal trademark laws. It is
therefore understandable that trademark law requires that the alleged dilution must amount to a
"commercial use in commerce." (15 U.S.C. § 1125). Despite falling within the reach of Congress's
regulatory  power by  being "in commerce," however, most artistic uses of another's trademark would
still be considered "noncommercial" in the First Amendment sense-that is, outside the definitional
bounds of the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. 
Because these same books and movies do more than propose a commercial transaction, the uses fall
squarely  into core, protected speech under the First Amendment-affording defendants constitutional
and statutory  defenses inapplicable to pure commercial speech. In addition, artistic uses prov ide
inherent defenses related to consumer sophistication and noncompetitive intent not available to
unauthorized uses in the commercial sphere.
T radem ark Infringem ent
The federal circuits use a variety  of tests to determine whether the defendant's 
conduct creates the "likelihood of confusion" necessary  to establish trademark infringement.
Essentially , all variations of the tests focus on some combination of the same eight factors: strength of
the plaintiff's mark, proximity  of the plaintiff's and defendant's goods, similarity  of marks, ev idence of
actual confusion, marketing channels used, ty pe of goods and degree of care likely  to be exercised by
the purchaser, the defendant's intent in selecting the mark, and likelihood of expansion of the product
lines. In the context of artistic works that do not compete with the trademarked products and
purposefully  seek to identify  the trademark, however, these factors are unwieldy  and unartfully
applied. For example, the court in Mattel noted that "when a trademark owner asserts a right to
control how we express ourselves-when people would find it difficult to describe the product any
other way  (as in the case of aspirin), or when the mark (like Rolls Roy ce) has taken on an expressive
meaning apart from its source-identify ing function-apply ing the traditional test fails to account for the
full weight of the public's interest in free expression." (296 F.3d at 900.)
In most infringement lawsuits brought against the creators of artistic works, the trademarks are well
known to consumers. In addition, there is usually  no doubt that the artists intentionally  use the mark
to conjure the plaintiff's mark in v iewers' minds. Despite the intention, however, it is clear that the
defendants' unauthorized use of the mark for artistic purposes does not promote a competing product.
That absence of direct competition between the trademark owner and the artist substantially  lessens
the likelihood of consumer confusion. As a result, there is ty pically  little ev idence showing that
defendants were attempting to shortcut their way  to an unfair and unearned commercial advantage by
using the plaintiffs' marks. Thus, when considering the distinctive markets and consumer
sophistication, it appears unlikely  that artistic works-especially  creative works of fiction-will actually
confuse consumers regarding an implied endorsement or sponsorship.
Also, in cases in which the purpose of a defendant's use is to identify  a plaintiff's product, even if the
ultimate goal is to describe a defendant's own product, the Ninth Circuit recognizes a nominative fair
use defense to infringement suits. Such cases are ty pified by  Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., in which the
court ruled that the defendant's unauthorized use of Princess Diana's name and likeness on its
products was nominative fair use, because the use merely  described the defendants' "Diana-related
products" and did not imply  that the plaintiff sponsored or endorsed them. (292 F.3d 1139 at 1151
(9th Cir. 2002)). In these cases, trademark law's three-factor nominative fair use test is used in lieu of
the multifactored likelihood-of-confusion test. It requires that the plaintiff's product must not be
readily  identifiable without the mark, only  so much of the mark may  be used as is reasonably
necessary  to identify  the plaintiff's product, and the defendant must do nothing suggesting the
plaintiff's sponsorship or endorsement.
Most courts recently  have sy mpathized with defendants asserting these defenses. In Hormel, Wham-
O, and Caterpillar the courts expressly  noted that moviegoers-even children-would understand that
the marks were being depicted to achieve a humorous effect, and since they  realize the fantastical
nature of the genre, they  would not be deceived into believ ing the plaintiffs endorsed the movies in
which their marks appeared. In addition, courts recognize the paradox inherent when a plaintiff
alleges confusion while asserting a tarnishment claim: If the trademark is disparaged, misused, or
placed in a negative context by  defendant's depiction, there is little likelihood that a reasonable
consumer will be fooled into thinking that the trademark owner sponsored or endorsed the portray al.
(See, Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 (song mocking the values represented by  Barbie dolls would not cause
confusion as to Mattel's sponsorship).) Finally , recent cases involv ing nominative fair use defenses
have all decidedly  found for the defendants. Though stated in different way s, the message is
unequivocal: In the absence of a clear showing of economic harm, courts are not interested in
protecting the purely  sy mbolic or expressive aspects of trademarks.
Even when plaintiffs can establish some likelihood of confusion, the First Amendment may  protect the
allegedly  infringing artistic use. For example, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit found the
defendant's use of Ginger Rogers's name in a movie title to be protected, holding that, generally , the
Lanham Act "should be construed to apply  to artistic works only  where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression." (87 5 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).)
Finding that the motion picture's title bore some artistic relevance to the underly ing work, the court
refused to find infringement, even though some moviegoers may  have mistakenly  believed that
Rogers was associated with the film. The public interest in free expression outweighed the concern
about consumer confusion.
Similarly , in Mattel, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers balancing test to reject Mattel's
Similarly , in Mattel, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Rogers balancing test to reject Mattel's
infringement claim concerning the musical composition "Barbie Girl." In apply ing the test, the court
concluded that any  confusion occasioned by  the song title was outweighed by  free speech concerns.
The Rogers and Mattel balancing approach represents a significant departure from the earlier
"alternative avenues test." This approach is best exemplified by  the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders case,
in which the court found the defendant-filmmaker liable, concluding that it could have expressed its
message about sexuality  in athletics by  an alternative method that did not evoke the plaintiff's mark.
(604 F.2d at 206). 
Ostensibly , both approaches remain valid. However, some courts and commentators have argued for
expanding the balancing test (Charles Atlas, Ltd. v. DC Comics, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y .
2000)), while concurrently  the trend seems to be to narrowly  interpret-if not ignore outright-the
Cheerleaders alternative-avenues test in favor of the Rogers balancing approach. For example, in the
recently  decided case of Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., the Ninth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's copy right, trademark, trade dress, and state law claims, apply ing the Rogers test to the title
of a photographic series, "Food Chain Barbie," in which the artist, without authorization,
photographed nude Barbie dolls in absurd and sexual circumstances involv ing food preparation.
(2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26294.)
T radem ark Dilution
After the Supreme Court's recent decision in Moseley, stating a claim under the Federal Trade Dilution
Act or FTDA (15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)) has become a two-step process. The first step is for a plaintiff to
show that its trademark is famous, the defendant used the mark after it became famous, the defendant
put the mark to a commercial use in commerce, and its mark suffered actual dilution. (Moseley, 537
U.S. 418). The second and often decisive step is determining whether the use falls into one of the
FTDA's enumerated exemptions, absolv ing the defendant from liability .
Courts ty pically  consider six  factors in assessing whether an artist's use erodes a trademark's product-
evoking qualities sufficiently  to establish a blurring claim: similarity  of the plaintiff's and the
defendant's mark, similarity  of the plaintiff's and the defendant's products, sophistication of
consumers, any  predatory  intent by  the defendant, renown of the plaintiff's mark, and renown of the
defendant's mark. In many  cases involv ing artistic works, the blurring framework is inapposite: Artists
use or display  the trademarked product to specifically  identify  the trademarked product and no other
product.
In most instances, referencing a product in an artistic work will not lessen the identify ing power of the
mark; to the contrary , presenting the mark in a motion picture or parody ing it in a magazine will more
likely  heighten association of the mark with the plaintiff's product. As the court noted in Hormel, a
case in which the meat company  sued over the creation and merchandising of a wild boar puppet
named Spa'am: "There is very  little likelihood that Henson's parody  will weaken the association
between the mark SPAM and Hormel's luncheon meat. Instead, like other spoofs, Henson's parody  will
tend to increase public identification of Hormel's mark with Hormel." (7 3 F.3d at 506.) Only  in limited
instances, such as the song title in Mattel, will a mark in an artistic work be used to identify  another
trademarked product, rendering blurring analy sis relevant.
After Moseley, it is also apparent that tarnishment claims against artistic works will not succeed
without clear ev idence of consumer confusion and resulting economic damage. Indeed, it remains
unclear whether tarnishment is still a v iable claim under the FTDA. In any  event, asserting such
claims appears to have little chance of succeeding in the face of the "noncommercial use" exception to
the FTDA. (15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(4)(b)). The exception, the parameters of which track the U.S. Supreme
Court's commercial speech doctrine, appears to shield motion pictures and other artistic expressions
from most blurring and tarnishment liability .
Undeniably , trademarked products have evolved into sy mbols for values, ideas, and experiences that
help shape popular cultures. Increasingly , artists reference these marks as a way  of effectively
communicating their expressive message. In recognition of this broader role of trademarks, courts
have narrowed the reach of trademark law to allow that trademarks be more freely  incorporated in
artistic works.
Robert C. Welsh is a partner and Pratheepan Gulasekaram is an associate at O'Melveny & Myers in
Century City.
Add your Comment
California Law yer reserves the right to delete any letter at its discretion; w e may remove letters that are off-topic, crude
or vulgar, are of low  quality or that violate the law  or common decency. California Law yer also reserves the right to edit
any letter for use in its print publication. By posting a comment, California Law yer does not necessarily endorse the
view s expressed.
* Indicates required f ield
*Please enter your name: 
*Please enter your E-mail: (will not be published) 
*Comment
 I have read and understand this disclaimer. 
*Enter the Text you see on the left: 
© 2013 Daily Journal Corporation
Editorial Calendar Advertise Privacy Policy
